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ABSTRACT 
 
 In A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume argues that moral judgments are the product of 
sentiment. The mechanism of sympathy allows individuals to enter into a common point of view in 
order to produce judgments that are truly moral, and not merely self-interested. Hume argues that 
the common point of view is the standard that moral judgments are subjected to. I argue that the 
common point of view is an inadequate standard for distinguishing between proper and improper 
moral judgments. The common point of view is inadequate because it is subjective and unreflective. 
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith offers an account of moral judgment that has an 
adequate standard for distinguishing between proper and improper moral judgments. Smith avoids 
the problems with Hume’s account due to his distinction between partial and impartial spectators 
and the role that self-command plays in his theory of moral judgment. 
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 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume famously argues that moral distinctions are the 
product of sentiment, not reason.1 Moral judgments, and our conception of virtue and vice, are 
rooted in sentiments of pleasure and pain. Hume’s conception of the nature of moral judgment has 
been a subject of controversy and debate since he first declared reason to be a passive principle, and 
not the source of our moral judgments. Disagreement with Hume often flows from a disagreement 
about whether reason, rather than sentiment, is actually the source of moral judgment. This thesis 
concerns whether or not Hume’s account of moral judgment is adequate, not whether or not 
sentiment is the source of moral judgments. In particular, I will argue that Hume’s account of moral 
judgment fails to provide an adequate standard to distinguish between proper and improper moral 
judgments. I will then argue that Adam Smith’s theory of moral judgment does provide an adequate 
standard for distinguishing between proper and improper moral judgments.  
Hume’s account of moral judgment is centered on a psychological mechanism called 
sympathy. According to Hume, our ability to make moral judgments depends on sympathy. In 
Section II of this paper, I begin by explaining the mechanics of sympathy, and its role in moral 
judgment. Sympathy allows individuals to consider sentiments from what Hume calls a “common 
point of view.” According to Hume, entering into the common point of view is what makes 
particular judgments moral. Adopting a common point of view is necessary and useful for societies to 
function. Furthermore, for Hume, the common point of view provides a standard for moral 
judgment.  
At the end of Section II, I argue that the common point of view fails to provide an 
inadequate standard of moral judgment for two specific reasons. First, the common point of view is 
                                                 
1 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000); hereafter cited as T by book, part, section, and paragraph number.  
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subjective—its judgments are the product of particular experiences. What the common point of 
view approves of is dependent on factors such as cultural norms, traditions, and customs. Second, 
the common point of view is unreflective—its judgments are the result of an unconscious and 
automatic process. When the common point of view approves of something, it does so without 
reasoning and reflecting on the judgment of approval. Due to these two features of Hume’s account 
of moral judgment, I maintain that it is an inadequate account.  
In Section III I hold that Adam Smith proposes an account of moral judgment in The Theory 
of Moral Sentiments that does have an adequate standard for distinguishing between proper and 
improper judgments. Smith’s theory, like Hume’s, centers on sympathy. I begin by describing 
Smith’s notion of sympathy, and then explain the role it plays in Smith’s account of moral judgment. 
In doing so, I hope to show the differences between Hume and Smith’s account that are relevant to 
my criticisms of Hume. Smith’s account of moral judgment is superior to Hume’s because of the 
role of self-command and its relationship to the highest standard of judgment: the impartial 
spectator.  
In differentiating between partial and impartial spectators, Smith overcomes the first 
objection against the common point of view. The impartial spectator provides an adequate standard 
of moral judgment because it does not simply reflect what is common, or popular—it is not 
subjective. As a result, the impartial spectator is importantly different from Hume’s common point 
of view. Secondly, Smith’s account of moral judgment is reflective. Where Hume insists on moral 
judgments being the result of unreflective and automatic responses, Smith provides a way in which 
the ultimate standard of moral judgment is the product of reflection. For Smith, mastery of the 
virtue of self-command differentiates between proper and improper judgments. As a result, Smith’s 
theory of moral judgment is not, like Hume’s, subjective or unreflective.  
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2. HUME’S ACCOUNT OF MORAL JUDGMENT 
 
2.1 The role and mechanics of sympathy 
For Hume, sympathy is a propensity we have in virtue of our constitution. Sympathy is 
present in children as well as in adults, and is responsible for what Hume calls “the great uniformity 
we may observe in the humours and turn of thinking of those of the same nation” (T 2.1.11.2). He 
describes sympathy as a communication of passions between individuals. At first, sympathy is 
described as a sort of emotional contagion, by which I mean a tendency to feel emotions that you 
observe in others. Hume says, “a cheerful countenance infuses a sensible complacency and serenity 
into my mind; as an angry or sorrowful one throws a sudden damp upon me” (T 2.1.11.2). For 
Hume, the propensity we have to communicate and share feelings with others is constitutive of our 
nature and of the utmost importance.  
The discussion of sympathy continues with a precise explanation of the mechanics of the 
process. The process of sympathy depends on a habit or custom of the mind of making causal 
inferences based on experience. Hume states,  
“when any affection is infus’d by sympathy, it is at first known only by its effects, 
and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an 
idea of it. This idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a 
degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an 
equal emotion, as any original affection” (T 2.1.11.3).  
 
By means of causal inferences, one forms an idea of a sentiment by seeing its effect. Upon 
perceiving the effect, the mind is determined to infer the cause of that sentiment.  This causal 
inference allows us to form an idea about another person’s sentiment. For instance, suppose I am at 
a park, and I see a little girl crying. I know from experience that crying is an expression of sadness, 
so this event conveys the idea of her sadness to me. My idea of sadness becomes an impression 
because I recall feelings of sadness I have experienced in the past.  
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Hume holds “that in judging of the actions of men we must proceed upon the same maxims, 
as when we reason concerning external objects” (T 2.3.1.12). Thus, the operations behind moral 
judgment are explained by the same principles or maxims at work in Hume’s account of the 
understanding. In what follows, I will explain the mechanics of sympathy in further detail. In order 
to demonstrate how the process of sympathy works, I must first give an account of the central ideas 
presented in Book 1 of the Treatise. 
In order to understand the mechanics of sympathy, it is necessary to return to the claims 
Hume makes at the beginning of the Treatise. Book 1 of the Treatise, Of The Understanding, begins the 
task of explaining our mental lives and relation to the external world in terms of experience. 
According to Hume, all perceptions of the mind are either ideas or impressions (T 1.1.1.1). The 
difference between ideas and impressions is one of degree, not of kind. Impressions are more lively 
or vivacious than ideas. Impressions include “all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they 
make their first appearance in the soul” (T 1.1.1.1). On the other hand, ideas are “faint images” of 
impressions found in “thinking and reasoning” (T 1.1.1.1).  
Hume further divides perceptions—impressions and ideas—by saying that some are simple, 
while others are complex. Accordingly, there are both simple and complex impressions, as well as 
simple and complex ideas. Simple impressions or ideas “are such as admit of no distinction nor 
separation” (T 1.1.1.2). It follows that complex impressions or ideas can be divided into parts. Hume 
further distinguishes between original and secondary impressions, or impressions of sensation and 
impressions of reflection. Original impressions include sensations such as seeing the color blue, or 
feeling the heat of the sun. These impressions are original because they are not derived from any 
other mental state. Secondary impressions are what Hume refers to as desires, emotions, and 
sentiments, and these are derived from other perceptions or mental states.   
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Perhaps Hume’s most significant claim in the Treatise concerns the relationship between 
impressions and ideas. According to Hume, “all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d 
from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent” (T 
1.1.1.7). In other words, all the ideas human beings have originate in sense experience. For example, 
my original impression of pain (say, at burning my hand on a hot stove) causes my idea of pain. 
Hume claims, “when one is born blind or deaf; not only the impressions are lost, but also their 
correspondent ideas; so that there never appear in the mind the least traces of either of them” (T 
1.1.1.9). Hume uses the copy principle as a methodological tool throughout the Treatise, and it is the 
basis of most of his arguments.  
Next, Hume explains how the mind associates or links perceptions. This process is 
understood under the general term of association. Hume lists three types of association: 
resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect. Resemblance is the relation that states that two 
perceptions are connected in the mind because they resemble each other. For example, I associate a 
picture of my friend with my friend because the picture resembles my friend. According to Hume, 
resemblance “is a relation, without which no philosophical relation can exist” (T 1.1.5.3). Contiguity 
concerns perceptions that are contiguous to each other in space or time. For example, I associate the 
idea of my neighbor’s house with the idea of my house, since the houses are next to each other. For 
Hume, the relation of cause and effect is the strongest, and most often explains how our mind goes 
from one idea to another.  
Hume spends a great deal of time on the subject of where the idea of causation originates. 
The idea of cause and effect relies in part on the relations of contiguity and priority. First, Hume 
holds “that whatever objects are consider’d as causes or effects, are contiguous and that nothing can 
operate in a time or place, which is ever so little remov’d from those of its existence” (T 1.3.2.6). 
Second, priority consists in the principle that a cause must be prior in time to its effect. However, 
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more is needed in order to arrive at the idea of causation. Hume points out that two objects can be 
contiguous, and one can be prior to the other, without any causal relationship existing between 
them. Hume claims “there is a NECESSARY CONNEXION to be taken into consideration; and 
that relation is of much greater importance, than any of the other two above-mention’d” (T 
1.3.2.11).  
According to Hume, two things explain how human beings have ideas about necessary 
connection between objects: our experience of constant conjunction between perceptions, and 
causal inferences we make from one perception to another.  When we observe two objects, and 
consider them in only one instance, we do not perceive any necessary connection between them. In 
other words, no particular instance can give us the idea of causation. This idea only arises as a result 
of constant conjunction. It is only when we observe two objects in several instances, and notice that they 
are always present together, that our minds establish a connection between them. For instance, I 
notice that each time it rains, the ground outside is wet. These two perceptions, of raining and of 
wetness, become associated with each other because they are constantly conjoined. According to 
Hume, “this multiplicity of resembling instances, therefore, constitutes the very essence of power or 
connexion, and is the source, from which the idea of it arises” (T 1.3.14.16).  
Furthermore, our experience of constant conjunction creates “a determination of the mind 
to pass from one object to its usual attendant” (T 1.3.14.20). For example, when I walk outside and 
see that the ground is wet, my mind immediately infers that it has rained, since my perceptions of 
rain and wetness outside have frequently occurred together.  Thus, the idea of causation arises in the 
mind as a result of constant conjunction, and is nothing but the mind’s tendency to infer from what is 
present to the senses to something else. The notion that the mind is causally structured applies not 
only to objects in the world, but also to human action, belief, and sentiment. Hume holds, “the 
union betwixt motives and actions has the same constancy, as that in any natural operations” (T 
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2.3.1.14). Thus, the Humean account of causal necessity, consisting in constant conjunction and 
causal inferences, applies to our cognition of human objects as well as natural objects. As a result, 
this view will have serious implications for Hume’s account of moral judgment, as discussed later 
on.  
The conversion of an idea into an impression is due to our relating ourselves to the object. 
For instance, my idea of a little girl’s sadness becomes an impression because I compare it to my 
own prior experience. Associating the sentiment of another with one of my own sentiments 
transforms the idea into an impression. Hume claims, “in sympathy there is an evident conversion 
of an idea into an impression” (T 2.1.11.8). The idea one has of another’s feeling becomes an 
impression, a feeling itself, because it is upped in vivacity. Hume explains, “this conversion arises 
from the relation of objects to ourself. Ourself is always intimately present to us” (T 2.1.11.8). In 
other words, sympathy requires that we identify some sort of relation between ourselves and the 
objects of our sympathy.   
Two principles of association help explain how this conversion process occurs.  Hume 
notes, “for besides the relation of cause and effect, by which we are convinc’d of the reality of the 
passion, with which we sympathize; besides this, I say, we must be assisted by the relations of 
resemblance and contiguity, in order to feel the sympathy in its full perfection” (T 2.1.11.8). The 
relation of resemblance allows us to make connections between ourselves and others that resemble 
us. Resemblance can be “any peculiar similarity in our manners, or character, or country, or 
language” (T 2.1.11.5). These resemblances facilitate sympathy, so that sympathy is found to be 
stronger or weaker in different cases. According to Hume, “the stronger the relation is betwixt 
ourselves and any object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition” between 
ourselves and the object (T 2.1.11.5). The more one resembles an object of sympathy, the more one 
will be able to sympathize with it.  
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 Similarly, the principle of contiguity also serves as an explanatory factor in the process of 
sympathy. Hume claims we “sympathize more with persons contiguous than with persons remote 
from us: With our acquaintance, than with strangers: With our countryman than with foreigners” (T 
3.3.1.14). For instance, we tend to be more affected by tragedies in our neighborhoods than 
tragedies elsewhere. Similarly, we more easily sympathize with those we are emotionally close to, 
such as family members or friends. Despite the fact “that nature has preserv’d a great resemblance 
among all human creatures” (T 2.1.11.5), this resemblance is often insufficient to generate sympathy 
in its full force. Consequently, the idea we form of another’s sentiment may lack the vivacity of an 
impression. The variation in the force of sympathy explained by resemblance raises questions 
concerning the ways in which sympathy may be limited and our moral judgments dependent on 
personal experience.  
 
2.2 A sentimentalist account of moral judgment 
 
It is the task of Book III, Of Morals, to explain how human beings distinguish between virtue 
and vice. In other words, Hume gives an account of the nature and origin of moral distinctions. As a 
branch of philosophy, morality is practical, rather than speculative, according to Hume. Hume holds 
that practical philosophy, which studies actions, cannot be devoted to a passive principle, such as 
reason. Experience has shown us that “morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions” (T 
3.1.1.6). Since Hume asserts, “that reason has no influence on our passions and actions” it must be 
conceded that the origins of moral distinctions are not a mere product of reason (T 3.1.1.7). Given 
that actions are not produced from reason, actions cannot be said to be reasonable or unreasonable, 
but rather laudable or blamable. Moral distinctions, according to Hume, “cannot be deriv’d from 
reason” (T 3.1.1.6) and therefore reason cannot give us a “sense of morals.” Reason only provides 
us with the necessary information so as to be able to make the sort of connections between ideas 
that morality requires.  
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Moral distinctions are not derived from reason, according to Hume, but are the product of 
sentiment. Hume considers the case of a willful murder in order to demonstrate how morality 
depends on sentiment. In the case of a willful murder, no matter of fact about vice can be discerned 
when you limit yourself to considering only the action. Reason can enable you to see that a murder 
occurred, piece together how and why it may have happened, but will not find vice in the action. 
Since the vice is not a quality of the action, “you can never find it, till you turn your reflexion into 
your own breast and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, toward this action” (T 
3.3.1.26).  Upon perceiving a willful murder, one feels disapprobation toward the action. This feeling 
of disapprobation within an individual attaches vice to the murder. For Hume, “vice and virtue…are 
not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind” (T 3.1.1.26). In other words, human beings 
project their feelings of approbation or disapprobation onto actions.  
Since there are no matter of facts or existences in the world that designate virtue or vice, for 
Hume, morality is “more properly felt than judg’d of” (T 3.1.2.1). Feelings of pleasure cause 
approval, while feelings of pain cause disapproval. Hume’s position stems from the fact that, on his 
view, “the chief spring or actuating principle of the human mind is pleasure or pain” (T 3.3.1.2). 
Consequently, we approve of what causes pleasure, and disapprove of what causes pain. Feelings of 
pleasure or pain are what constitute judgments of all kinds. According to Hume, “an action, or 
sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why? Because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness 
of a particular kind” (T 3.1.2.3). It is our sentiments about objects that render those objects either 
virtuous or virtuous. Hence, feelings of pleasure or displeasure explain the moral distinctions we 
make.  
There is something distinctive about the feelings that generate moral judgments. Moral 
evaluations consist in a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind due to the work of sympathy. 
According to Hume, “no quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its 
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consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by 
communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our 
own” (T 2.1.11.2). As previously noted, sympathy is a psychological mechanism that allows the 
communication of passions between individuals. Sympathy enables us to “get outside ourselves” and 
consider objects not from our particular interest, but from a common point of view. This shift in 
perspective is what allows individuals to make sentiment based moral judgments.  
According to Hume, sympathy produces moral sentiments. By means of sympathy, individuals 
adopt a common point of view “from which they might survey their object, and which might cause 
it to appear the same to all of them” (T 3.3.1.30). Hume believes that by adopting the common 
point of view an individual’s judgments amount to more than mere prejudice and self-interest.  
Hume states, “t’is only when a character is consider’d in general, without reference to our particular 
interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or evil” (T 
3.1.2.4).   Thus, what makes a feeling or sentiment moral is that its object is considered in general, 
and not from one’s own subjective standpoint.  The relevant feeling of pleasure or displeasure must 
arise from a consideration of a character or sentiment from the common point of view.  
Sympathy plays a significant role in moral judgment because it allows individuals to live 
harmoniously with each other. The fact that human beings are endowed with a propensity to share 
sentiments with those around them is beneficial to society. For instance, in considering whether a 
certain action is right or wrong, an individual can refer to her own feelings on the matter, or 
consider the case more generally. Taking on a more general perspective facilitates commodious 
living. According to Hume, in every society, in both peaceful and warlike nations, “common interest 
and utility beget infallibly a standard of right and wrong.”2 Appealing to this standard, rather than to 
one’s individual standard, is in every individual’s self-interest. Thus, for Hume, sympathy is 
                                                 
2 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge, 
3rd ed. revised by P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 211; hereafter cited as EPM by page number. 
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especially remarkable because it is the glue that keeps society together. The fact that individuals can 
share sentiments and appeal to a common moral standard enables societies to function properly.  
 
2.3 Objections to Hume’s account  
The central problem with Hume’s account of moral judgment is that it does not provide an 
adequate standard for distinguishing between proper and improper moral judgments. In other 
words, Hume’s account does not have the tools necessary to determine whether or not a particular 
judgment is correct or incorrect. Hume’s account of moral judgment may be descriptively strong—
that is, it may describe how we come to have moral judgments, or why we have the moral judgments 
we do—but it fails to provide an adequate evaluative standard. An adequate evaluative standard 
should be able to criticize moral judgments for what are typically considered morally relevant 
reasons. Moral judgments should reflect some awareness of the peculiar authority of morality, and 
these judgments should be reached in some reflective capacity.  
For Hume, all of our causal inferences find their basis in experience. One’s personal 
experience is the starting point for sympathy based inferences as well as inferences in general. When 
it comes to moral judgment, one might wonder how the difference in personal experience influences 
the specific ways one is able to sympathize and generate moral judgments. Annette Baier notes that 
Hume was sensitive to the objection that his account of sympathy in the Treatise relied too heavily on 
individual experience3. Given Hume’s claim that we “never really advance a step beyond ourselves” 
(T 1.2.6.10), one might wonder how the shift from first person singular to first person plural 
perspective required by the common point of view is possible. In other words, how could it be 
possible that our moral judgments reflect anything but our own feelings or taste? 
                                                 
3 Annette Baier, and Anik Waldow, "A Conversation between Annette Baier and Anik Waldow about Hume's Account 
of Sympathy," Hume Studies, 34, no. 1 (2008): 61-87.  
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Nevertheless, Hume attempts to provide an explanation for how moral judgments are 
subject to a standard. Hume acknowledges that there must be some way of distinguishing between 
personal sentiments and those that we nominate moral sentiments. Such a standard is necessary 
given that individuals have different experiences and preferences, which in turn will influence their 
moral judgments. Much of what makes our judgments moral is that they have the proper starting 
point. For Hume, moral judgments are moral simply because they do not originate from an individual 
point of view. What makes certain sentiments moral is that they originate from the common point of 
view. The common point of view is meant to overcome the limits of individual experience.  
For Hume, individuals can look towards the common point of view in order to direct their 
sentiments properly. Hume states, “in order [to]… arrive at a more stable judgment of things, we fix 
on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, 
whatever may be our present situation” (T 3.3.1.15). Placing oneself in the common point of view is 
what, on Hume’s view, accounts for the shift from first-person singular to first-person plural 
perspective. According to Hume, “in general, all sentiments of blame or praise are variable…but 
these variations we regard not in our general decisions, but still apply the terms expressive of our 
liking or dislike, in the same manner, as if we remain’d in one point of view” (T 3.3.1.16).  In other 
words, when we view things from the common point of view, we correct our sentiments by making 
them more general. Sentiments originating from the common point of view are general in the sense 
that they do not spring from a personal standpoint but from a common viewpoint.  
Correcting our sentiments through use of the common point of view is useful to us. 
According to Hume, “experience soon teaches us this method of correcting our sentiments, or at 
least, of correcting our language where the sentiments are more stubborn and inalterable” (T 
3.3.1.16). Through experience, individuals learn that it is necessary to correct one’s sentiments or 
moderate one’s expression of said sentiments in order to live harmoniously with others. Although 
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individuals are heavily swayed and influenced by their particular situations, if everyone followed only 
his personal standard of judgment, discourse among individuals would be impossible. The essential 
function of the common point of view is to render our sentiments more social, thereby making us 
appear more amiable to our fellows.  
My objection to the common point of view is two-pronged. First, the common point of 
view, despite making moral judgments more general, remains subjective. While the common point 
of view stresses moving away from individual opinion or experience, it simply replaces it with a 
common subjective standpoint. In other words, the common point of view is an aggregate of 
subjective viewpoints. While it does not refer to one individual viewpoint, the problem of 
subjectivity remains. This common standpoint is subjective because it reflects the customs, beliefs, 
and desires of a particular group of people. What distinguishes between proper and improper 
judgments is merely the standards of a particular society. Another, perhaps more common, way of 
phrasing this objection would be to say that Hume supports some sort of moral relativism. 
It seems that on Hume’s account, individuals must correct their sentiments in order to gain 
the favor of others. Correcting one’s sentiments properly depends on particular features of a society. 
When engaging in public discourse about moral matters, Hume stresses that it is necessary to neglect 
the differences in sentiments that may exist in order to “render our sentiments more public and 
social” (EPM, 229). The ways in which individuals will correct their sentiments and thereby be 
judged is determined by what is common in a certain society. So, correcting our sentiments is simply 
a matter of making them align more perfectly with the sentiments of our fellows.  
For Hume, the correction of sentiments is important. The importance placed on correcting 
our sentiments can be explained by Hume’s conception of virtue. Hume distinguishes between two 
types of virtues. For Hume, virtue is a mental quality that tends to produce behavior that is either 
agreeable to its possessor or his fellows, or useful to its possessor or his fellows (T 3.3.1.30). Natural 
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virtues are those that arise directly out of human psychology, such as benevolence. Artificial virtues, 
such as justice, are rooted in conventions and practices that emerge gradually. Hume is particularly 
interested in the origin of the artificial virtues, and our regard for them. The correction of 
sentiments through use of the common point of view is a gradual process, rooted in convention, and 
is an essential part in maintaining the stability of society.  
Hume’s account of artificial virtue is relevant to his account of moral judgment because the 
common point of view, like the artificial virtues, arises out of the needs of society. For Hume, the 
artificial virtues are “human contrivances for the interest of society” (T 3.3.1.9). Hume’s discussion 
of justice sheds particular light on the way general rules are formed for the interest of society. On 
Hume’s account, the rules of justice arise gradually out of conventions that the human condition 
requires. Human beings are naturally partial, meaning they prefer themselves and those close to 
them to others (T 3.2.2.6). This “opposition of passions” between individuals is augmented by the 
fact that there is a scarcity and instability of resources (T 3.2.2.6). The understanding that these 
conditions lead to disadvantages for all leads to the establishment of the rules of justice, which help 
secure one’s interest. The rules of justice prove to be beneficial both for society as a whole and to 
individuals.  
Similarly, the common point of view is beneficial to individuals and to society in that it 
combats the opposition of passions by appealing to a common standard. To Hume’s credit, the 
common point of view does seem to explain how individuals can come to properly direct their 
sentiments in the interest of maintaining stability and sociability with each other. The common point 
of view explains why individuals may be motivated to moderate their sentiments when those 
sentiments will offend their fellows or conflict with common opinion. So, in one sense, Hume does 
provide a way of correcting moral sentiments. The problem lies in the fact that this mechanism of 
correction is inadequate. Put more plainly, the common point of view does not offer a method of 
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correction that necessarily corrects sentiments. Rather, the common point of view seems to align one’s 
sentiments with others. However, it seems that an adequate normative standard must say more than 
what would be prudent or in one’s self-interest.  
In order to motivate this objection to Hume, let us consider a virtuous individual that 
happens to find himself in a corrupt society. Hume offers such an example in his discussion of 
justice in EPM. Hume asks us to suppose “that it should be a virtuous man’s fate to fall into a 
society of ruffians, remote from the protection of laws and government; what conduct must he 
embrace in that melancholy situation” (EPM, 187). The answer Hume provides speaks volumes 
about the kind of standards he can apply to morality—namely, that this standard is subjective, or 
relative. In light of such a depraved situation, the virtuous man has no other recourse than to look 
after his self-interest. According to Hume, “he must consult the dictates of self-preservation alone, 
without concern for those who no longer merit his care and attention” (EPM, 187). The virtuous 
man is no longer required to be virtuous.  
One might respond on Hume’s behalf and claim that it is perfectly natural that in a 
completely amoral society, one should tend to one’s self-preservation alone. Hume’s example is 
extreme, and is meant to show that justice applies only when it is useful. My point is to show that 
when an individual finds himself in a depraved society, this individual has no higher standard to look 
to but the common point of view shaped by clearly immoral people. There is a sense in which 
morality calls on us to make judgments despite the fact that they unpopular, or imprudent. The 
common point of view only corrects sentiments when that point of view reflects proper judgments, 
and calls on an agent to take those judgments on.  
However, as has been noted, when the common point of view is improper, an agent is called 
upon to take on this improper viewpoint as well. If an individual’s sentiments conflict with the 
common point of view, it does not necessarily follow that the common point of view provides the 
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proper sentiments in a certain situation, and that the individual should adopt those sentiments. And 
yet, morality should provide some standard that agents can look to for guidance. The common point 
of view simply does not provide the kind of guidance expected by moral agents. The common point 
of view produces arbitrary judgments. If the common point of view is the only resource one has to 
correct improper sentiments, then sentiments may be changed and yet not directed properly.  
My second objection is related to the first, and it consists in the claim that Hume’s account 
of moral judgment is unreflective. As previously noted, the common point of view is the standard of 
moral judgment that Hume provides. This standard is further undermined by the way it comes 
about. The starting point of moral judgment is sympathy, which is based in ideas that correspond to 
impressions. As discussed in section 2.1, our impressions, and thus ideas, are rooted in individual 
experience. On Hume’s account, the ideas we have about the world are the result of custom, or of 
the mind being determined in particular ways. Our ideas are linked together by the principles of 
association—resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect. Individuals are largely unaware of how 
their minds are determined, and the way the mind is determined in turn influences sympathy. Hence, 
individuals are unaware of how or why they approve or disapprove of others.   
For instance, consider the role that resemblance plays in the sympathetic process. Hume 
admits that sometimes, when resemblance is lacking between oneself and one’s object of sympathy, 
one may not sympathize with the object. We may form an idea, but not an impression, of another’s 
suffering, if resemblance fails to give sympathize its full force. Surely, we want to be able to say that 
it is possible to sympathize with those that are very different from us. It seems as though I want to 
be able to sympathize with starving children in Africa, even if I cannot relate to certain aspects of 
their situation. Alternatively, we may sympathize with others because they resemble us, and not 
because they are actually worthy of our sympathy. But more importantly, it seems as though Hume 
lacks the resources to say that one can reflect and approve or disapprove of other’s sentiments for 
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the right reasons. Because sympathy relies on automatic principles of association, such as 
resemblance, an individual is unlikely to recognize the faults in his judgments.  
The common point of view is unreflective because the standard it provides is completely 
dependent on automatic principles, determined by habit or custom. The work of the principle of 
resemblance in the sympathetic process demonstrates this weakness. On Hume’s account, we simply 
will judge people that resemble us more favorably—and may not even be conscious that we are 
doing so. In this way, human beings are engaged in a non-reflective process. Hume notes, “the 
custom operates before we have time for reflection” (T 1.3.8.13). In other words, individuals do not 
reflect on the ideas they are moved to have, or the judgments they make. That sympathy is non-
reflective might not seem problematic in itself. However, it is difficult to understand how an account 
of moral judgment is actually an account of judging when nothing that seems like judging occurs. 
Hume asserts “that the understanding or imagination can draw inferences from past experience, 
without reflecting on it; much more without forming any principle concerning it, or reasoning upon 
that principle” (1.3.8.13). Hence, for Hume, moral judgments are the product of an automatic 
process, a process which largely depends on subjective experience, and which cannot be reflected 
upon.  
One might object on Hume’s behalf that I have exaggerated the degree to which moral 
judgment is automatic for Hume. It may be argued that Hume does provide examples of individuals 
reflecting on their sentiments in order to change them. That very well may be the case. Even so, the 
kind of reflection allowed in Hume’s account is limited due to the issues I raised in my first 
objection. Put more plainly, an individual can reflect and change his or her sentiments to align them 
with the common point of view. Changing one’s sentiments this way is a habit gained through 
experience, and often requires very little reflection. More importantly, the reflection concerns what 
others will approve of, or what will render one’s sentiments more sociable. So, even if Hume allows 
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for individuals to reflect and change their sentiments, this reflection concerns figuring out what will 
be greeted with approval, and not reflecting on what is right or proper.  
An adequate account of moral judgment must contain a standard that is objective and 
reflective. Individuals must look beyond custom in order to determine what sentiments are actually 
proper. Appealing to this sort of higher standard often requires a great deal of reflection. Gilbert 
Harman poses this problem nicely in “Moral Agent and Impartial Spectator.” According to Harman, 
spectator theories—such as Hume’s---are open to the objection that “the desire to do what is right is 
the desire to act in a way that spectators will approve”4. In other words, having the proper 
sentiments is only a matter of gaining approval from others who may or may not be in a position to 
determine what is right. Harman, like myself, argues that Hume cannot properly respond to this 
objection, but finds that Adam Smith has a convincing response. Smith’s account is able to provide 
an adequate standard of moral judgment because, unlike Hume, Smith describes a moral standard 
that accurately tracks what is proper—it is objective and reflective. Smith’s discussion of the 
impartial spectator, and its relationship to self-command, renders his theory superior to Hume’s. At 
this juncture I will explain in greater detail the aspects of Smith’s theory that allow him to avoid 
Hume’s shortcomings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. SMITH’S ACCOUNT OF MORAL JUDGMENT 
 
3.1  Sympathy and spectatorship 
 
                                                 
4 Gilbert Harman, "Moral Agent and Impartial Spectator," Explaining Value: and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 181-195, 184.  
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In The Impartial Spectator, D.D. Raphael notes the influence of Hume on Adam Smith. He 
writes, “I think Adam Smith took it for granted that Hume had demonstrated beyond challenge his 
conclusion that moral distinctions arise from feeling. Smith therefore proceeded on the assumption 
that any further contribution to moral philosophy must make ‘sentiment’, in the sense of feeling, the 
basic element of its account”5. Accordingly, Smith does not argue for the position that moral 
distinctions arise from feeling. Taking that as his starting point, he gives an account of how moral 
distinctions arise from feeling or sentiment.  
Smith provides an alternative to Hume’s account, and it is one that provides an adequate 
standard of moral judgment. By differentiating between partial and impartial spectators, and 
stressing the role of self-command in moral judgment, Smith is able to give an account of moral 
judgment that is objective and reflective. Additionally, Smith provides a better account of 
sympathy’s role in moral judgment, specifically by identifying how sympathy can produce proper 
judgments. In this section, I explain Smith’s conception of sympathy, in order to later describe his 
account of moral judgment and argue for its strength.  
Smith begins The Theory of Moral Sentiments by boldly asserting that human beings are naturally 
social and, to some degree, sensitive to the sentiments of others6. The belief that human beings are 
not fundamentally selfish underlies his notion of sympathy. Although sympathy has traditionally been 
understood as compassion for the plight of others, Smith’s definition is broader. For Smith, 
sympathy is the faculty of the mind “made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion 
whatever” (TMS I.i.I.5). Like Hume, Smith understands sympathy as enabling us to share passions 
with others. For example, sympathy explains why we feel resentment towards someone who we 
know has wronged someone else.  
                                                 
5 D.D. Raphael , The Impartial Spectator: Adam Smith's Moral Philosophy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
7. 
6 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, edited by K. Haakonssen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); 
hereafter cited as TMS by part, section, chapter, and paragraph number.  
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Sympathy requires more than simply perceiving a sentiment or emotion in an agent. 
Although “upon some occasions sympathy may seem to arise merely from the view of a certain 
emotion in another person” (TMS I.i.I.6), Smith clearly believes that sympathy of this type is 
imperfect. When we witness some sign of grief or joy in an agent, we form the idea that some good 
or bad event has caused this sentiment in them. In these cases, our sympathy is imperfect until “we 
are informed of the cause” (TMS I.i.I.9).  Hence, simply witnessing some sign of suffering generates 
curiosity in the spectator, “along with some disposition to sympathize with him, than any actually 
sympathy that is very sensible” (TMS I.i.I.9).   
When an agent observes an expression of a passion, he or she becomes curious as to the 
cause of that passion. This curiosity is accompanied by a disposition to sympathize, before any 
actual sympathy takes place. Until one is familiar with the cause of the passion, one’s sympathy is 
not very considerable. Hence, Smith asserts that sympathy “does not arise so much from the view of 
the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it” (TMS I.i.I.10). For example, we often feel 
for others what they do not or cannot feel for themselves—this type of sympathy is often referred 
to as illusive sympathy. Such is the case with our sympathy with the dead. We sympathize with their 
situation, and with the situations of those affected, but not with a passion. In the case of the dead, 
this is clear, because the dead do not have any passions at all which could be the grounds for 
sympathy. Rather, we imagine what it would be like to feel forgotten, or to miss our loved ones, even 
though the dead are incapable of feeling anything.  
Similarly, we often sympathize with those that are not capable of feeling or acting properly, 
such as the mentally ill or children. Smith notes that “we blush for the imprudence and rudeness of 
another, though he himself appears to have no sense of the impropriety of his own behavior” (TMS 
I.i.I.10). The cause of our reactive attitude in this case is that we imagine ourselves in the other’s 
situation, and feel that were we in that situation, we would be embarrassed of our behavior. This 
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principle explains why, for example, I might cringe upon observing a child speak rudely, or feel 
regret when an elderly person forgets their manners.  
Sympathy requires the use of the imagination because we must imagine ourselves in 
another’s place in order to “conceive or to be affected by what he feels” (TMS I.i.I.3). The 
imagination allows us to place ourselves in another’s situation and form some idea of what that 
person is feeling. This process allows us to feel what that person is feeling, although to a weaker 
degree. The imagination, giving rise to sympathy, in turn provides the necessary tools for moral 
judgment within Smith’s framework. Raphael is correct to point out that “on most occasions 
imagination is a prerequisite for sympathy”7. Imagination is what constitutes our disposition to 
sympathize. However, imagination itself does not result in sympathy that is very sensible, as Smith 
puts it.  
Smith carefully explains that sympathy varies depending on the passion one is sympathizing 
with. He states, “there are some passions of which the expressions excite no sort of sympathy, but 
before we are acquainted with what gave occasion to them, serve rather to disgust and provoke us 
against them” (TMS I.i.I.7). For example, we tend to express disgust at the behavior of an angry 
man, rather than at the cause of his anger, until we are acquainted with that cause. Smith reasons this 
is so, because, “as we are unacquainted with his provocation, we cannot bring his case home to 
ourselves, nor conceive any thing like the passion which it excites” (TMS I.i.I.7). Hence, for Smith, a 
certain amount of information is necessary in order for sympathy to work. Smith holds, “even our 
sympathy with the grief and joy of another, before we are informed of the cause of either, is always 
extremely imperfect” (TMS I.i.I.9).  
Smith holds that sympathy is always pleasurable. He goes as far as to claim that “nothing 
pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own 
                                                 
7 Raphael, 13.  
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breast” (TMS I.i.II.1). This claim is a result of Smith’s conception of our fundamental nature as 
human beings. Smith’s conception of our sentiments is fundamentally social, as is his view of 
morality. He rejects the notion that human beings are primarily or solely self-interested. To the 
contrary, Smith holds that individuals are highly affected and motivated by their relationships with 
others, and that we care deeply about others’ opinions of us. Sympathy, which allows us to connect 
emotionally with others, is crucial to our psychological and emotional well-being. For Smith, “the 
correspondence of the sentiments of others with our own appears to be a cause of pleasure, and the 
want of it a cause of pain” (TMS I.i.II.2). For instance, sympathy increases our joy, since we take 
satisfaction from sharing our joy with another, and observing their experience of it. On the other 
hand, grief is alleviated by sympathy, as we feel a sort of pleasure at our grief being recognized and 
shared, to some degree, by others.  
Sympathy pleases us when we are sympathizing with other’s passions, as well as when they 
sympathize with our own. It gives us pleasure to celebrate the joy and accomplishments of others, as 
well as to share in their grief. Smith stresses that sympathy causes pleasure even when the sentiment 
we are sympathizing with is unpleasant. Hume objects to this point, finding it implausible that 
sympathy with grief, for instance, could be pleasurable. Surely, sharing in the grief of another cannot 
be pleasurable. But Smith replies, “the pleasure which we find in the conversation of one whom in 
all the passions of his heart we can entirely sympathize with, seems to do more than compensate the 
painfulness of that sorrow with which the view of his situation affects us” (TMS I.i.II.6). For Smith, 
the act of sympathizing is pleasurable because it fulfills an important emotional need we have to 
connect with others. It follows that when we cannot sympathize, we feel pain or displeasure at our 
inability to do so.  
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3.2   Spectatorship and moral judgment 
Sympathy plays a crucial role in the process of making moral judgments. First, sympathy 
explains how we make judgments about other people. When we enter into another’s situation by 
means of the imagination, we “form some idea of his sensations” (TMS I.i.I.2) and then can observe 
whether or not his sentiments agree with our own. A positive judgment of another’s sentiments 
occurs when a spectator and an agent’s sentiments are in perfect concord. Hence, “to approve of the 
passions of another…is the same thing as to observe that we entirely sympathize with them” (TMS 
I.i.III.1). Similarly, when we do not approve of another’s sentiments, we judge their sentiments 
negatively, and this “is the same thing as to observe that we do not entirely sympathize with them” 
(TMS I.i.III.1). When we make judgments about other’s sentiments, our own imagined sentiments 
are the only standard available to us.  
Secondly, sympathy explains how we form judgments about ourselves (TMS I.i.IV.8). Smith 
holds that self-assessment entails the division of the self into two people, the spectator and the agent 
(TMS III.i.I.6). By dividing oneself this way, the agent places himself in the spectator’s situation and 
views his own case as “if he was only one of the spectators of his own situation” (TMS I.i.IV.8). To 
approve or disapprove of one’s own conduct consists in feeling “that, when we place ourselves in 
the situation of another man…we either can or cannot entirely sympathize with the sentiments and 
motives which influenced it” (TMS III.i.I.2). Due to “an original desire to please” (TMS III.i.II.6) 
the people around us, we learn to moderate our sentiments so that others can sympathize with them. 
Nevertheless, the people we know are imperfect judges since they are partial spectators. As a result, 
although God “has made man…the immediate judge of mankind,” when we judge ourselves, we 
must also refer “to a much higher tribunal,” that of the impartial spectator (TMS III.i.II.32).  
In order to be certain that we judge ourselves fairly we must consult the impartial spectator. 
The impartiality of our judgments is important to us because we naturally desire to be praise-worthy 
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(TMS III.i.II.1). Smith insists that the desire for praise-worthiness cannot be satisfied by undeserved 
praise. As a result, we want to be certain that the judgments we receive are warranted.  Since 
interests and inclinations shape our companions’ judgments of us, we cannot rely on their judgments 
to be fair. In order to judge ourselves impartially, “we conceive ourselves as acting in the presence of 
a person quite candid and equitable” (TMS III.i.II.32). This imagined impartial spectator is 
disinterested and well informed. This “man within the breast” is an internalized external perspective 
that represents our conscience in its ideal form (TMS III.i.II.32). In other words, the perspective of 
the impartial spectator is one that individuals internalize, much in the same way one develops a 
conscience. One approves of one’s own sentiments “by sympathy with the approbation of this 
supposed equitable judge” (TMS III.i.I.2).  By contrast, one disapproves of one’s sentiments when 
the impartial spectator cannot sympathize with them.  
When judging our own sentiments, we need to view ourselves in an impartial light in order 
to properly weigh our interests against those of others (TMS III.i.II.32). Although we naturally 
prefer ourselves to others, when we view ourselves as others do, we realize that they cannot 
sympathize with our self-love (TMS II.ii.II.1). The impartial spectator curbs the power of self-love 
by reminding us “that we are but one of the multitude” (TMS III.i.III.4). Still, the violence of our 
self-love can  “pervert the rectitude of our own judgments” even when the impartial spectator is 
present (TMS III.i.IV.1). Smith asserts that although we must strive for impartiality, we often fall 
short. Smith explains that, as a result, general rules of morality are formed, based on our experience 
of what is naturally approved or disapproved of.  
Smith focuses on two types of moral judgments we make: judgments about propriety, and 
judgments about merit. For the purposes of this thesis, I will focus on judgments about propriety. 
For judgments about propriety, we consider a sentiment “in relation to the cause which excites it, or 
the motive which gives occasion to it” (TMS I.i.III.5). Propriety concerns the suitability or 
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appropriateness of a certain sentiment or action given its cause. For example, when judging the 
propriety of someone’s grief, we consider the cause of the grief to determine whether or not the 
sentiment is appropriate. Thus, to approve of a sentiment is to find that it is proper, given its cause, 
and to disapprove of a sentiment is to judge it improper, given its cause. 
There are two distinct types of judgment made concerning propriety. First, “when the 
objects which excite them are considered without any particular relation, either to ourselves or to the 
person whose sentiments we judge of” (TMS I.i.IV.1).  Judgments of this sort include aesthetic 
judgments, such as our sentiments about the beauty of flowers, or the vastness of the ocean. Smith 
notes, “all the general subjects of science and taste, are what we and our companion regard as having 
no peculiar relation to either of us. We both look at them from the same point of view” (TMS 
I.i.IV.2). Judgments of this sort do not require sympathy. According to Smith, human beings 
naturally share sentiments on these matters.   
The concordance of sentiments is not found as easily when objects stand in peculiar 
relations to oneself or others. Smith explains, “with regard to those objects, which affect in a 
particular manner either ourselves or the person whose sentiments we judge of it, it is at once more 
difficult to preserve this harmony and correspondence, and at the same time, vastly more important” 
(TMS I.i.IV.5). It is more difficult because it is difficult for me to perfectly understand and feel 
another’s grief, even when I change places with him. This difference is due to the fact that “we do 
not view them from the same station, as we do a picture, or a poem, or a system of philosophy, and 
are, therefore, apt to be very differently affected by them” (TMS I.i.IV.5). The difference in our 
sentiments with what personally concerns us is more likely to cause conflict than mere aesthetic 
disagreements. One can overlook disagreement with regards to taste, but this is not the case when, 
for instance, someone does not sympathize with your misfortune. In that case, one feels slighted, 
and resentment towards those who does not sympathize with his sufferings, or celebrate his success.  
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Sympathy allows for a correspondence of sentiments, even when the sentiments are of 
particular concern. In these cases, the spectator must put himself in the place of the agent, or the 
person principally concerned. This requires that the spectator consider all the circumstances of the 
case, and how they might affect the agent. Even when a spectator imagines himself in that situation 
which the agent is in, “the emotions of the spectator will still be very apt to fall short of the violence 
of what is felt by the sufferer” (TMS I.i.IV.7). Although human beings are naturally sympathetic, 
sympathy only takes us so far. What the spectator feels will differ from what the agent feels “because 
the secret consciousness that the change of situations, from which the sympathetic sentiment arises, 
is but imaginary, not only lowers it in degree, but, in some measure, varies it in kind, and gives it a 
quite different modification” (TMS I.i.IV.7). Despite these differences, Smith maintains that 
sympathy, although imperfect, is sufficient for the needs of society.  
There is much controversy in Smith literature concerning what work the imagination does in 
the sympathetic process. This subject bears significance in how sympathy figures in moral judgment. 
In “Adam Smith’s Concept of Sympathy and its Contemporary Interpretations,” Bence Nanay notes 
that the imagination involved with sympathy requires imagining from the inside. There are two ways 
imagining from the inside can be interpreted:  
1) Imagining having X’s experiences: X occurs in the content of my imaginative 
episode, I myself may not.  
2) Imagining being in X’s situation: X herself does not even occur in the content of 
my imaginative episode.8  
Who appears in this imaginative episode is significant for the strength of Smith’s theory. When a 
spectator imagines being in another’s situation, are they imagining themselves, or the agent? Darwall 
suggests, “when we judge someone’s feeling or reaction, we do so from her patient’s perspective, 
                                                 
8 Bence Nanay, “Adam Smith’s Concept of Sympathy, and its Contemporary Interpretations,” The Adam Smith Review, 
vol. 5 edited by Vivienne Brown and Samuel Fleischacker (New York: Routledge, 2010), 85-105, 88.  
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viewing the situation as we imagine it to confront her as someone responding to it. Both judgments 
involve an implicit identification with, and thus respect for, the other as having an independent 
point of view.”9 But this misses the mark. What Darwall suggests is too subjective, and more akin to 
what Hume describes. If a spectator is meant to judge the propriety of an agent’s sentiments, then 
identifying and respecting these sentiments simply because the spectator has adopted them does no 
work for Smith. All this would require would be for the spectator to imagine being X, and feeling what 
X feels.  
 The kind of imagination Smith has in mind must be more similar to (2), although it’s unclear 
whether or not that even captures the process perfectly. Whereas (1) stresses that a spectator 
imagines being X in a situation, (2) only requires that a spectator imagine the situation itself. In this 
case, imagination is only a vehicle for moral judgment. It allows the spectator to gain relevant 
information about the situation to judge what is proper. What is proper will be a result of the 
particular situation, not of the mental state of X. The importance of this point cannot be stressed 
enough. If, as Darwall suggests, a spectator were to adopt the agent’s point of view, moral judgment 
would arise from a subjective point of view—just a different one than the spectator’s. Moreover, 
viewing the situation as the person currently in the situation views it adds nothing new. What is 
needed in moral judgment is another perspective, not adopting the perspective of a particular agent.  
Although it is indisputable that the imagination plays a significant role in Smith’s account of 
sympathy, I take it that while the imagination is a pre-condition for sympathy, it is not what is 
significant about sympathy. The real work in the sympathetic process, what, in turn, makes moral 
judgment possible is self-command. Self-command enables the spectator to take on a different point 
of view, but it is not merely the point of view already embodied by a particular agent. The practice of 
self-command is what allows a spectator to actually judge the propriety of a sentiment that the 
                                                 
9 Nanay 91-92.  
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imagination allows the spectator to feel. Furthermore, self-command has an important connection 
to the impartial spectator. The impartial spectator and self-command enable Smith to respond to the 
objections concerning subjectivity and reflection that I raised against Hume.   
 
3.3  Self-command and the impartial spectator 
Smith’s emphasis on the impartial spectator and self-command is an attempt to provide an 
adequate standard of moral judgment. The impartial spectator is the normative standard one appeals 
to in distinguishing between proper and improper judgments, and it is made possible through self-
command. By emphasizing the roles that the impartial spectator and self-command play in moral 
judgment, Smith is able to avoid the criticisms leveled against Hume—namely, that moral judgments 
merely reflect subjective and unreflective sentiments. By distinguishing the impartial spectator from 
partial spectators, Smith can provide a standard that goes above and beyond Hume’s common point 
of view.   
The process of sympathy makes moral judgment possible, but for Smith, only sympathy with 
the impartial spectator results in proper judgments. Fleischacker notes,  “sympathy functions as the 
mechanism by which the impartial spectator can operate, but it is only the sympathy of the impartial 
spectator that provides a standard for moral judgment”10. Smith’s impartial spectator importantly 
differentiates him from Hume. Fleischacker adds, “Smith's insistence that sympathy be impartial 
would by itself be at least a shift of emphasis from Hutcheson's and Hume's theories of moral 
approbation”11. The impartial spectator is able to do for Smith what the common point of view fails 
to do for Hume. For Hume, sympathy that generates moral judgments looks to the common point 
of view. But the common point of view is not impartial. The common point of view is biased or 
                                                 
10 Samuel Fleischacker, “Philosophy in Moral Practice: Kant and Adam Smith,” Kant-Studien, 82. no. 3 (1991): 249-269, 
258. 
11 Fleischacker, 258.  
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prejudiced by a society’s particular manners, customs, and beliefs. As mentioned earlier, the 
common point of view merely shifts from an individual subjective viewpoint to a common one that 
is limited and shaped by certain factors. The impartiality in Smith’s theory provides him with 
grounds for responding to objections concerning the subjectivity of moral judgment.  
In section 2.3, I argued that Hume’s common point of view is open to two damning 
objections. The first involved the fact that the common point of view, by emphasizing the utility of 
sympathy, lacks certain normative force. Smith disagrees with Hume concerning utility, and the role 
it has in our moral approbation. Smith rejects the idea that utility is what first leads us to approve of 
certain qualities. According to Smith, “originally, however, we approve of another man’s judgment, 
not as something useful, but as right, as accurate, as agreeable to truth and reality” (TMS I.i.IV.4). 
The appeal to truth sets a higher standard than to what is useful or popular. Smith holds, “it seems 
impossible that the approbation of virtue should be a sentiment of the same kind with that by which 
we approve of a convenient and well-contrived building” (TMS IV.i.II.4). In other words, in making 
moral judgments, our sentiments reflect more than what is useful, or pleasant. Smith is especially 
sensitive to the fact that what is true, correct, or proper, often differs from what is deemed useful, or 
what is praised.  
One way Smith emphasizes the unique character of moral judgments is in distinguishing 
between praise and praiseworthiness. In Part III of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith distinguishes 
the love of praiseworthiness from the love of praise. The latter is the natural desire to obtain the 
favorable sentiments of others. Additionally, Smith claims that “man naturally desires, not only to be 
loved, but to be lovely; or to be that thing which is the natural and proper object of love” (TMS 
III.i.II.1). Similarly, Smith claims that man naturally fears not only being hated, but being the proper 
object of hate. The love of praiseworthiness is the love of what is honorable and noble, not a mere 
love of approval. Smith also distinguishes praise and praiseworthiness by likening them to what is 
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and what ought to be. As regards the sentiments of others about one’s conduct, “praise and blame 
express what actually are” (TMS III.i.II.25). Praiseworthiness is meant to provide a higher standard 
of evaluation. Hence, Smith posits that praiseworthiness and blameworthiness express “what 
naturally ought to be the sentiments of other people with regard to our character and conduct” 
(TMS III.i.II.25). The distinction between praise and praiseworthiness captures the weakness of 
Hume’s appeal to the common point of view, which maps on to what is praised, and not necessarily 
what is praiseworthy.  
According to Smith, because the desire for praise and the desire for praiseworthiness are 
distinct, they cannot be satisfied in the same way. For example, if one receives compliments on a 
meal he or she did not cook, their desire for praise might be satisfied, but not their desire for 
praiseworthiness. The knowledge that the praise was unwarranted, since the individual does not 
actually possess the qualities being admired, signals to the individual that he is not praiseworthy. 
Smith calls this “the most humbling of all reflections, the reflection of what we ought to be, but 
what we are not” (TMS III.i.II.4). According to Smith, the desire to actually be what the people 
around us approve of, rather than just appear to be that way, demonstrates how human beings are 
naturally endowed with the capacity for virtue.  
Smith’s account suggests that the strength of these desires differs depending on the 
individual. One’s character depends, in many respects, on whether one primarily desires praise or 
praiseworthiness. Despite his remarks to the contrary, Smith does concede that praise can provide 
satisfaction when it is unwarranted. It is the “foolish liar” and the “important coxcomb” who are 
pleased with unwarranted praise (TMS III.i.II.4). Unwarranted praise satisfies only “the weakest and 
most superficial of mankind” (TMS III.i.II.7). In contrast, the virtuous person finds no pleasure in 
groundless applause. Moreover, the virtuous person’s highest source of satisfaction often comes 
from doing what he knows to be praiseworthy, even when he knows it will receive no praise. The 
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love of praiseworthiness is stronger than the love of praise in “every well-formed mind” (TMS 
III.i.II.7). Thus, the strength of the desire for praiseworthiness serves as a standard to distinguish 
between good and bad characters. Unfortunately, the love of praise and the love of praiseworthiness 
are often hard to distinguish. Smith notes that these two principles “resemble one another” and are 
“often blended with one another” (TMS III.i.II.2). As a result, it is difficult to determine whether an 
agent is motivated by the desire for praise or the desire for praiseworthiness.  
Nevertheless, in order to distinguish between these desires, there must be some standard 
that distinguishes between what receives praise and what deserves praise. For Smith, the impartial 
spectator serves as the standard that distinguishes between what is praised and what is praiseworthy. 
When it comes to determining what is proper, we cannot depend on partial spectators whose 
judgments are influenced by their interests and inclinations. Conversely, the impartial spectator, the 
“man within the breast,” is well-informed and fair (TMS III.i.II.32). One approves of sentiments “by 
sympathy with the approbation of this supposed equitable judge” (TMS III.i.I.2). In other words, we 
defer to the impartial spectator when it comes to making judgments about what is praiseworthy.  
The higher standard of the impartial spectator is especially important because the judgments 
we make are often incorrect. For instance, a man is accused of stealing and, although he is innocent, 
he is punished and ostracized by his peers for the crime. If this man cared solely about what others 
thought of him, his happiness would depend completely on their opinions of him. Smith wants to 
avoid this consequence, especially given how often people make incorrect judgments. Thus, Smith 
claims “the man who is conscious to himself that he has exactly observed those measures of conduct 
which experience informs him are generally agreeable, reflects with satisfaction on the propriety of 
his own behavior” (TMS III.i.II.5). Just as the desire for praiseworthiness varies in individuals, so 
does the reflective ability to view oneself as the impartial spectator would.  
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An individual’s development of the ability to consult the impartial spectator depends on 
experience. Individuals must be able to imagine the sentiments of others that do not actually take 
place, but which are “natural and ordinary” in response to a behavior (TMS III.i.II.5). Through 
experience, individuals develop the habit of connecting certain sentiments to actions, and are 
therefore able to imagine what the proper sentiments would be in a particular situation.   Similarly, 
one way to understand the origin of the love of praiseworthiness is as a development of what we 
naturally approve of and admire in others.  For instance, Smith explains that the anxious desire we 
have to succeed “is originally founded in our admiration of the excellence of others” (TMS 
III.i.II.3). In other words, we naturally desire to be as amiable and admirable as those whom we 
consider to be the most amiable and admirable. In order to satisfy this desire, “we must become the 
impartial spectators of our own character and conduct” (TMS III.i.II.3). Due to the desire to be 
praiseworthy, in order to feel satisfied that we are truly deserving of the praise we receive, we must 
examine ourselves from an impartial perspective. At the very least, the virtuous person must be able 
to distinguish between what receives praise and what deserves praise by appealing to the impartial 
spectator.  
The distinction between praise and praiseworthiness clarifies one way in which Smith is 
concerned with finding a standard of moral judgment that is not subjective. The issue of the 
appropriate standard is important in considering what type of spectator one is dealing with. Smith is 
careful to distinguish between partial and impartial spectators, and as readers of Smith, we must be 
careful as well. Raphael suggests that Smith developed his impartial spectator theory as a result of an 
objection by Sir Gilbert Elliot. The objection challenged Smith to differentiate the impartial 
spectator—the highest tribunal of judgment—from normal spectators. Raphael defends Smith, 
explaining that the impartial spectator, the man within the breast, is not “purely a reflection of actual 
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social attitudes”12.  Although the impartial spectator is initially developed through experience, 
Raphael suggests it gains its independence through the use of the imagination. While I agree that the 
impartial spectator does gain independence, I believe that it is through the practice of self-command, 
not through use of the imagination.  
One reason for the distinction between partial spectators and the impartial spectator is that 
partial spectators exercise self-command to a different degree than the impartial spectator. Just as 
Smith distinguishes between real spectators and the impartial spectator, he distinguishes between 
different stages of self-command. The “rudimentary stage” of self-command depends on the 
sentiments of real spectators, whereas the higher stage depends on conscience—on the man within 
the breast. Self-command is what makes the sympathy of the impartial spectator a standard above 
the sympathy we feel with partial spectators. Self-command also accounts for why Smith escapes the 
second objection I raised against Hume. Smith’s theory of moral judgment is not unreflective in the 
way Hume’s is due to the role of self-command.  
Self-command—the regulation of one’s passions—is central to Smith’s conception of 
impartial judgment. Self-command is obtained through a regard for “real or supposed” spectators 
(T.M.S. III.i.III.21).  For Smith, self-command is both a psychological capacity and a virtue. It is a 
capacity that must be developed. We first develop this capacity as children in order to gain the 
approval of our parents, teachers, and classmates. All human beings have the capacity for self-
command, and exercise it to different degrees. Smith explains the different degrees of self-command 
by describing three people: the weakest man, the man of a little more firmness, and the man of real 
constancy.  
The weakest man has barely developed the capacity of self-command. Although he can 
moderate his sentiments, he does so only briefly. He soon returns to his situation, “and endeavors, 
                                                 
12 Raphael, 36.  
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like a child that has not yet gone to school, to produce some sort of harmony between his own grief 
and the compassion of the spectator, not by moderating the former, but by importunately calling on 
the latter” (T.M.S. III.i.III.23). In other words, the weakest man is infrequently moved to practice 
self-command, and is not very good at doing it. The man of a little more firmness does a better job, 
according to Smith. This man takes greater interest in the approval of those around him—of partial 
spectators. The man of a little more firmness “approves and applauds himself by sympathy with 
their approbation, and the pleasure which he derives from this sentiment supports and enables him 
more easily to continue this generous effort” (T.M.S. III.i.III.24). In other words, the approval of 
partial spectators motivates the man of a little more firmness to practice self-command, at least 
when he is in the presence of others.  
Finally, the man of real constancy has developed the capacity of self-command to its fullest 
degree. According to Smith, “the man of real constancy and firmness, the wise and just man who 
has been thoroughly bred in the great school of self-command…maintains this control of his 
passive feelings upon all occasions” (T.M.S. III.i.III.25). This man practices self-command regardless 
of whether or not he is alone, or in the company of others. Unlike the man of a little more firmness, 
the man of real constancy is not motivated by the approval of partial spectators. Smith asserts, “[the 
man of real constancy] has never dared to forget for one moment the judgment which the impartial 
spectator would pass upon his sentiments and conduct. He has never dared to suffer the man within 
the breast to be absent one moment from his attention” (T.M.S. III.i.III.25). The man of constancy 
has developed the capacity of self-command into a virtue, and therefore always consults the 
impartial spectator.  
As a virtue, self-command is the psychological capacity developed to an excellent degree. 
The virtuous person, the man of constancy, not only “enters into the great school of self-command” 
but exercises discipline to become the master of himself (T.M.S. III.i.III.21). The master of self-
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command is virtuous because he is in control of his passions. This person acts “with cool 
deliberation in the midst of the greatest dangers and difficulties” (T.M.S. VI.iii.III.11). The master of 
self-command is able to make proper judgments even in the most challenging situations. Self-
command of this sort is possible through “constant practice” (T.M.S. III.i.III.25). In other words, 
mastery of self-command takes a great deal of effort and reflection.  
The practice of self-command is essential for virtue. According to Smith, self-command “is 
not only itself a great virtue, but from it all the other virtues seem to derive their principal lustre” 
(TMS VI.iii.11). Smith’s theory of moral judgment stresses the importance of placing oneself in 
another’s place in order to make impartial judgments. The act of sympathizing requires a sort of 
humbling of sentiments, so that a concord of sentiments can be reached. For Smith, this practice of 
humbling oneself is the most important virtue. The reflective nature of Smith’s account is 
underscored by the connection between moral judgment and the virtue of self-command.  
Raphael notes that the first use of the term “impartial spectator” occurs in the discussion of 
self-command. Raphael suggests that “self-command is essentially to feel for ourselves only what we 
see others can feel for us”13. Similarly, in consulting the impartial spectator, we approve of 
sentiments only if a well-informed and disinterred spectator could sympathize with them. Both self-
command and the impartial spectator help us moderate our sentiments in order to make proper 
judgments. Hence, Raphael holds that the role the impartial spectator plays in humbling self-love “is 
closely akin to self-command”14. In other words, becoming the impartial spectator is an act of self-
command. The most notable aspect of Smith’s theory of moral judgment is tightly connected to 
what he deems to be the virtue from which all other virtues are derived.  
Proper moral judgment requires the virtue of self-command. The virtuous person, who has 
mastered the practice of self-command, sets “the idea of exact propriety and perfection” as his 
                                                 
13 Raphael, 34.  
14 Raphael, 40.  
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standard (T.M.S. VI.iii.III.23). Smith posits that the virtuous person has studied this standard more 
than other people have, and as a result understands it better and is more motivated by it. Thus, 
although the virtuous person cannot reach this standard, “he endeavors as well as he can, to 
assimilate his own character to this archetype of perfection” (T.M.S. VI.iii.III.25). Due to the 
exercise of self-command, the virtuous person has a higher moral standard than the non-virtuous 
person. The exercise of self-command activates “the real love of virtue” that we are enabled to have 
due to the natural desire to be praise worthy (T.M.S. III.i.II.7). Hence, Smith’s standard of propriety 
is the result of much reflection and care, unlike Hume’s, which arises automatically and without 
reflection.   
Due to the roles of the impartial spectator and self-command, Smith’s account of moral 
judgment is tightly linked to a conception of virtue. To be virtuous consists in part in making proper 
moral judgments, or, to appealing to the right standard.  Making proper moral judgments requires the 
exercise of self-command, so that we can judge impartially and not merely report our subjective 
feelings or preferences. Smith’s account is significant in its attention to the problem of self-
deception. Fleischacker notes, “Smith is practically unique, among eighteenth century British 
thinkers…in making the dishonesty of the self to itself a prime issue in moral philosophy”15. Smith’s 
discussion of sympathy, and of moral judgment, is unique in that he spends a great deal of time on 
the question of how individuals can come to judge themselves properly. Smith notes, “rather than 
see our own behavior under so disagreeable an aspect, we too often, foolishly and weakly, endeavor 
to exasperate anew those unjust passions which had formerly misled us” (TMS III.i.IV.4). Smith 
emphasizes that our moral feelings are weak and easily corrupted, and provides a way to at least 
partially overcome this inevitable truth about our nature.  
                                                 
15 Fleischacker, 256.  
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To sum up, Smith’s theory of moral judgment has a theory of virtue built into it. The 
standard he provides for moral judgment, that of the impartial spectator, reflects the perfection of 
the virtue of self-command. For Smith, the person who has internalized the impartial spectator’s 
perspective is analogous to the master of self-command. These two people are the same, for they 
both have overcome self-preference in order to make fair judgments. This gives Smith a clear way to 
distinguish between proper and improper judgments, and to deny that moral judgments are 
subjective and unreflective. For Smith, the impartial spectator is the ideal spectator because she has 
learned how to sympathize correctly. In other words, the impartial spectator’s judgments reflect an 
impressive development of the faculty of sympathy. When the impartial spectator sympathizes with 
some given sentiment, we can feel comfortable with the fact that the impartial spectator is 
sympathizing with something that should be sympathized with. Put more clearly, the impartial 
spectator sympathizes with the right things. The impartial spectator’s sympathy is synonymous with 
the approval of virtue.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
In this project, I began by summarizing Hume’s account of moral judgment and raising two 
objections to it. I argued that Hume fails to provide an adequate standard of moral judgment 
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because the common point of view is subjective and unreflective. Then, I hoped to show that 
Smith’s account of moral judgment provides an adequate standard for distinguishing between proper 
and improper judgments. In doing so, my primary goal was to highlight an aspect of Smith’s theory 
that I believe is often overlooked—the role of self-command. Smith is often lauded for his impartial 
spectator—the feature that most obviously sets him apart from contemporaries such as Hume. But 
it is his commitment to self-command that informs the development of the impartial spectator, and 
his decision to stress the difference between partial spectators and the impartial spectators.  
In clearly distinguishing between partial and impartial spectators, Smith is able to show that 
his standard of moral judgment is not, like Hume’s, subject to the criticism that it merely reflects 
public opinion, or is subjective. Smith goes to great lengths to avoid this objection, not only by 
introducing the impartial spectator, but also by distinguishing between the desire for praise and the 
desire for praiseworthiness. He condemns the former, and holds up the latter as an ideal we should 
all aspire to—an ideal that self-command and the impartial spectator can help us achieve. 
Furthermore, Smith’s discussion of self-command shows how reflection is necessary in order to 
distinguish between proper and improper judgments. For Smith, only the master of self-command, 
who has put a great deal of reflection into his judgments, is able to accurately distinguish between 
proper and improper judgments by occupying the impartial spectator’s perspective.  
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